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R. Richard Banks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of contemporary legal scholarship expresses a narrative
impulse. Eschewing the traditional norms and forms of legal scholar-
ship, many professors have turned to storytelling to capture issues not
* Reginald F. Lewis Fellow, Harvard Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School 1994; A.M.,
A.B. Stanford University 1987. For their incisive comments on an earlier version of this review,
I thank Brian Bix, Jennifer Eberhardt, Duncan Kennedy, and Daryl Scott. I am also grateful to
Randall Kennedy, Joseph Singer, and Kathleen Sullivan for their support and encouragement,
which helped to make this and other projects possible. Finally, thanks to Ian Ayres and Jennifer
Brown for suggesting that I write this Book Review.
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easily elucidated through more conventional approaches.' Although
the narrative approach has recently come to prominence through the
writings of critical feminist2 and critical race theory scholars,3 the use
of narrative in legal scholarship is not a recent development.'
Intellectuals and writers both within and without the academy have
recently produced a significant amount of personal writing about race
that parallels and sometimes overlaps the legal storytelling
movement.5 This writing ranges from personal essays,
6 to memoirs,7
to full autobiographies.8 Black9 law professors, in particular, have
1. Narrative is thought to highlight concerns that would otherwise be ignored in traditional
scholarship due to "the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings
[that form] a background [against] which legal and political discourse takes place." Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411
(1989); see also LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); LAW'S STORIES
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAW'S STORIES] (containing articles by
Martha Minow, Harlon Dalton, Reva Siegal, Catherine MacKinnon, and others); Symposium,
Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (containing articles by Patricia Williams, David
Luban, Steven L. Winter, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Joseph William Singer, Toni M.
Massaro, Mari Matsuda, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Clark D. Cunningham).
2. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991)
(summarizing and critiquing use of narratives in critical feminist legal scholarship).
3. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); DERRICK BELL,
GOSPEL CHOIRS (1996); RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? (1996); RICHARD
DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991); Charles Lawrence, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992). For criticism of the use of narrative by critical race
scholars, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of Law School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of
Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
4. See, e.g., LAW'S STORIES, supra note 1 (discussing role of narrative in legal analysis and
judicial reasoning); Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (explaining ways in which normative meaning is created
through narrative, legal or otherwise); Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62
HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949) (presenting fictional judicial opinions of fictional court about fictional
case as means of demonstrating extent to which contradictory judicial decisions can be derived
from same set of facts).
5. For example, many of those who have recently published personal books about race are
law professors. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY (1991); JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN (1995); GREGORY H.
WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE (1995); WILLIAMS, supra note 3; PATRICIA WILLIAMS,
THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1996).
6. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 5; LAWRENCE OTIS GRAHAM, MEMBER OF THE CLUB
(1995).
7. See, e.g., LORENE CARY, BLACK ICE (1991); HENRY LOUIS GATES, COLORED PEOPLE:
A MEMOIR (1994); JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY (1993).
8. See, e.g., PATRICE GAINES, LAUGHING IN THE DARK (1994); JEROLD LADD, OUT OF THE
MADNESS (1994); MARCUS MABRY, WHITE BUCKS AND BLACK-EYED PEAS (1995); NATHAN
MCCALL, MAKES ME WANNA HOLLER (1992); SCOTT MINERBROOK, DIVIDED TO THE VEIN
(1995); ITABARI NJERI, EVERY GOODBYE AIN'T GONE (1992).
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recently published personal writings about race intended for a broader
audience than that of traditional legal scholarship.1°
Racial Healing: Confronting the Fear Between Blacks and Whites
reflects both recent legal scholarship's narrative impulse and the turn
toward personal writing about race. Racial Healing is a personal book
about the public issue of race. Professor Dalton blends personal
experience and social analysis and switches frequently between first
and third person. Rejecting a narrow focus on discrete legal or
political controversies, Dalton's wide-ranging discussion illustrates the
breadth of issues implicated by what Dalton characterizes as the
"deep and abiding wound11  [of race, which] [i]f left
untreated ... will continue to ooze and fester."12
In the first and second parts of the book, Dalton explores the
importance of communication to the process of racial healing,
highlighting the benefits of as well as the impediments to interracial
discussion. Dalton believes that in American society race,
paradoxically, both prevents dialogue and makes it necessary.
In the third and fourth sections of the book, Dalton offers advice
to whites and blacks, respectively, on how to promote racial healing.
Dalton advises whites to acknowledge the privilege that comes from
being white, to take shared ownership of the race problem, not to
promote dissension among or within minority communities, and to
reject the image of rugged individualism enshrined in the Horatio
Alger myth. Dalton believes that the Horatio Alger myth, by denying
the extent to which race shapes individual opportunity,' 3 "serves to
maintain the racial pecking order . . . mentally bypassing the role of
race in American society ... [and] fostering beliefs that themselves
serve to trivialize, if not erase, the social meaning of race.' '1 4 To
enact Dalton's suggestions, whites must "conceive of themselves as
members of a race and . . . recognize the advantages that attach to
simply having white skin."15
Dalton urges blacks to pull together as an inclusive community, to
re-evaluate black culture in order to determine which aspects of it
9. Throughout this Book Review, I use the terms blacks, black Americans, and African
Americans interchangeably. In my view, the term employed to designate those Americans with
African ancestry is immaterial compared to the way in which the group is regarded.
10. See, e.g., SCALES-TRENT, supra note 5; WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
11. He borrows the wound metaphor from WENDELL BERRY, THE HIDDEN WOUND (1970).
12. HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS
AND WHITES 3 (1995). Dalton returns repeatedly to the image of racial problems as a wound.
"The central message of this book is that, if left untended, America's hidden wound will
continue to cause us no end of sorrow." Id. at 96.
13. See id. at 128-30.
14. Id. at 132.
15. Id. at 6.
1997]
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should be preserved and which not, to reject the view that black
Americans "deserve more from society than do other people of
color," 16 and to retell their story of racial oppression "to describe
more precisely how slavery lives on in our lives; not as broken bones
or clanking chains, but as a largely unconscious way of framing how
we are seen, how we see ourselves, and how we relate to the world
around us."' 7
In the final section of the book, Dalton explores his vision of the
"racial Promised Land"'" he believes America will reach if it makes
"a genuine commitment to the process of racial healing."' 9 Racial
healing in American society would help to create "a future in which
there are no permanent winners and permanent losers, in which race
and social position have no correlation and in which true equality is
the norm rather than the exception."2 Dalton does not want to
abolish race,2' but rather to "uncouple race and power"22 while
maintaining racial group identity and its cultural products.' "The
fact that people come in different colors is not a problem, nor are
racial differences necessarily a bad thing,"24 Dalton concludes. "What
needs changing is the negative value our society places on racial
difference, and its use of race as a basis for maintaining a social
hierarchy."25 Dalton opposes the homogenizing effect of racial
assimilation and urges that in the process of changing the meaning of
race "we need to allow some room for ... group characteristics and
preferences to form.
2 6
Racial Healing raises many issues in many different contexts. In this
Book Review I will amplify and expand upon Dalton's analysis of the
processes that shape debate about race in a manner that calls into
question the extent to which interracial dialogue about racial issues
can promote racial progress. Dalton identifies lack of communication
across racial lines as an important impediment to enhanced racial
understanding, improved race relations, and greater racial equality.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id. at 157.
18. Id. at 213.
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id. at 101.
21. He would not want to live in a place, for example, where race had been completely
eliminated. See id. at 217-18.
22. Id. at 222.
23. One of the reasons Dalton would prefer to maintain race is the "cultural heterogeneity"
which he believes is tied to race. Id. at 218.
24. Id. at 220.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 221.
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"We are loath to confront one another around race,"27 Dalton begins
the introduction. "We are afraid of tapping into pent-up anger,
frustration, resentment, and pain. Even when we are not aware of
harboring such feelings ourselves, we recognize that they exist in
others. Our natural tendency is to hold them in check, in hopes that
they will somehow fade away."28
Dalton knows, of course, that dialogue alone is not sufficient for
racial change. He emphasizes that dialogue is enhanced by an
understanding of one's own identity, which leads Dalton to discuss
extensively racial consciousness and identity. "[W]hen we try to
understand others without first understanding ourselves, when we
strive to see through their eyes without first recognizing the limits of
our own vision, we inevitably view their differences in a negative
light."29 He writes, "Unless we recognize our own situatedness, we
will never get at the truth, or come to realize that it has many
faces."3 In Dalton's view, dialogue and identity are interrelated.
Attitudes and ideas about race are coupled with attitudes and ideas
about oneself and one's own racial group. Changing one's view of
one's racial self, then, should alter one's attitude toward race more
generally and open the way to improved interracial dialogue.
While Dalton recognizes the impediments to interracial debate
about race, he also emphasizes its integral and transformative role in
racial healing. "Unlike those who counsel smoothing over our
differences and pushing our fears to the side, [Dalton is] convinced
that the only way to truly heal the past and prepare for a more just
future is to ... let it all hang out."31 The best way, in Dalton's view,
to "achieve racial healing [is to] confront each other, take risks, make
ourselves vulnerable, put pride aside, say all the things we are not
supposed to say in mixed company-in short, put on the table all of
our fears, trepidations, wishes and hopes.
32
Dalton's hopeful view reminds us that change can occur and
encourages us all to work toward bringing it about. This book's
greatest contributions to our ongoing national dialogue about race are
Dalton's steadfast faith in the possibility of change and his willingness
to map the path toward healing. Rather than highlight reasons why
change will not come, Dalton strives to show the way.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 46.
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id. at 97.
32. Id. at 4.
1997]
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My purpose in this Book Review, in part as a counterpoint to
Dalton's unwavering optimism, is not to explain the potential benefits
of dialogue, but rather to investigate its pitfalls and impediments.33
Whereas Dalton stresses the possibility of dialogic transformation, I
highlight the reasons that apparent transformation is as likely illusory
as real. Yet, helping to delinate the obstacles to efficaious dialogue
embodies faith in its transformative potential as well. Public dialogue
can promote change only if its difficulties are successfully and
forthrightly confronted.
In Part II of this Book Review, I provide an overview of the role
of dialogue in American society and explain Dalton's analysis of the
effect of interracial dialogue on racial healing. In Part III, I highlight
the reasons that dialogue may fail to promote the remediation of
racial inequality, an analysis based in part on the distinction between
private, interpersonal dialogue and public debate. In Part IV, I offer
a model of interracial dialogue about race. I suggest that public
interracial dialogue concerning issues related to race is characterized
by the interaction of A) racial group power disparities, B) the
legitimating power of blackness, and C) widespread, though often
unstated, beliefs about black Americans. These three factors may, in
fact, foster debate that reinforces racial inequality while obscuring the
process through which it does so.
II. THE CASE FOR DIALOGUE
Dialogue is central to American society, and its primacy is
enshrined in the First Amendment. Why speech is so important is, of
course, a matter of debate.34
Speech may be important because it serves the needs of indiv-
duals35 or because it furthers the ends of American democracy.
33. I do not offer any prescriptive analysis regarding the realization of the values that
animate free speech principles. Nor do I analyze legal doctrine relevant to the regulation of
speech.
34. Various rationales have been proffered to account for the significance of speech and to
justify the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-89 (2d ed. 1988). An interesting response to and
recognition of the importance of speech is MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
35. Speech may be important because it fulfills the needs of individuals that are met through
speech and communication, including such needs as dignity, autonomy, and self-realization. For
a discussion of societal versus individual justifications, see SCHAUER, supra note 34. In this Book
Review, insofar as I am concerned with justifications for speech, I am only concerned with those
related to societal needs or functions.
222
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Public discourse" may serve democracy either by leading to truth or
by allowing the participation of diverse members of
society-participation that is essential to democratic self-gover-
nance.
37
The metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas, 38 best embodies the
notion that communication leads to truth. Faith in the marketplace of
ideas reflects the belief that "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas [than by suppression of ideas]. The best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market., 39 Only through open dialogue, according
to this view, can the best ideas come to the fore.'
An alternative view is that dialogue is essential to the processes of
democracy.41 The political and social order of democracy can be
thought of as "the product of a dialogic communicative exchange
open to all."42 Dialogue then does not merely facilitate democracy;
it comprises democracy,4 3 "public discourse [being] the com-
municative medium through which the democratic 'self' is itself
constituted.""
Within the legal academy the faith in dialogue is best exemplified
by republicanism, a resurgent aspect of constitutional thought and
36. I use the term public discourse to refer to issues of public concern that are debated in
a public forum. I use the term public discourse interchangibly with public debate and public
dialogue.
37. See FISS, supra note 34; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1276 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefanic, Images] (noting "tenet of liberal
jurisprudence that by talk, dialogue, exhortation and so on, we can present each other with
passionate, appealing messages that will counter the evil ones of racism and sexism, and thereby
advance society to greater levels of fairness and humanity").
38. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 15-34; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:
A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
41. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING
OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX 123 (1994); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 77 (1965) (arguing that "unabridged freedom of public discussion is the rock on which
our government stands"); SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 35-46 (discussing justification of free
speech guarantee through reference to workings of democracy).
42. Post, supra note 41, at 125 (discussing views of Hans Kelsen); see HANS KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961).
43. See, e.g., BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A
NEW AGE 136 (1984) (arguing that "strong democratic legitimacy" depends on "ongoing talk");
JAMES T. FARREL, DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959) (quoting
Dewey's observation that "[d]emocracy begins in conversation"); 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 81 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (describing common
will of democratic nation as "communicatively shaped and discursively clarified in the political
public sphere"); CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 39 (David Macey
trans., 1988) (discussing importance of "legitimacy" of debate in democratic state).
44. Post, supra note 41, at 127.
19971
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social theory.45 Republicanism presupposes that people can effec-
tively dialogue based on their sense of the common good 46 and that
through dialogue people can come to understand the views of
others.47 "Republicanism favors a highly participatory form of
politics, involving citizens directly in dialogue and discussion.
' 48
"[R]epublican deliberation... [is] an engagement of political equals
who, whatever their possible diversity of situation, interest, or
normative outlook, are united in their commitment to good faith
pursuit of their common good and in their reliance upon each other's
like commitments.,
49
Some legal scholars doubt the efficacy of republicanism in
ameliorating racial inequality." More generally, many of these
scholars question the extent to which "[o]ur much vaunted system of
free expression, with its marketplace of ideas, [can] correct serious
systemic ills such as racism and sexism."51 These skeptics of dialogue
argue that the First Amendment's principle of free expression
erroneously "presumes some level of social equality among people
and hence essentially equal social access to the means of expres-
sion."5 2 Because "those with the most money can buy the most
speech,"53 these skeptical scholars argue, the marketplace of ideas
may merely reflect and perhaps legitimate the unequal social and
economic status of different groups in American society.
Dalton is not one of the skeptics. For all his recognition of the
impediments to dialogue, Dalton maintains great faith in its efficacy.
"Engagement is critical to healing," he writes. "It has the potential to
45. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 131 (1995); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter
Michelman, 1985 Term]; Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131
(1995); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
46. In contrast, interest-group pluralism envisions individuals and groups competing in the
political and economic marketplace to satisfy their own, perhaps narrowly defined, interests.
47. See Michelman, 1985 Term, supra note 45, at 72; see also Martha Minow, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (explaining
importance and efficacy of assuming perspectives other than one's own in order to further social
justice).
48. Michelman, 1985 Term, supra note 45, at 40.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609 (1988) (rejecting notion that republicanism would adequately account for and
address interests of black Americans); Delgado & Stefanic, Images, supra note 37, at 1276
(rejecting ability of dialogue to lead to substantive change).
51. Delgado & Stefanic, supra note 37, at 1260; see also MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 34.
52. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 129 (1987); see also MATSUDA ET
AL., supra note 34.
53. MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 140.
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transform our lives."54 Throughout this Book Review, I refer to the
belief that interracial dialogue promotes the remediation of racial
inequality as the "dialogue as transformation" approach.
In the first chapter of Racial Healing, Dalton recounts an episode
in which the mundane and tiresome process of moving his residence
provided the setting for an inspirational conversation about race. A
decade ago, while in the process of moving from one New Haven
neighborhood to another, Dalton "heard someone gently tapping on
[his] car window... a youngish-looking white woman peering into the
car and smiling quizzically."55 A native of Poland who had been in
the United States less than a year, she asked why he was moving and
then launched into a series of questions about race, the sort of
pointed and difficult questions about black poverty and crime that are
rarely discussed frankly between blacks and whites.56 Initially, Dalton
"stared at her hard, and tried to decide whether to wither her with
scorn or ice her with contempt."" Then he looked at her "gentle and
inquisitive [face that] radiated intelligence, warmth and genuine
curiosity,"" and realized that, as a foreigner, his visitor was ignorant
of the etiquette of racial debate and "meant ... no harm."59 During
her time in the United States, the great gulf she had noticed between
blacks and whites raised questions to which she now wanted answers.
Rather than "skim the surface"' as is common in discussions about
race, Dalton and the young woman had an hour and a half conver-
sation that was "frustrating and at the same time so exhilarating."6
Her refusal to accept Dalton's pat answers about race led him to
reject them as well, resulting in an exchange that was rare in its
candor and thoughtfulness.62 Looking back on their first meeting,
Dalton describes it as "a one-of-a-kind experience."' "We were able
to hear one another, to push one another, to be honest with one
another, to engage one another."' Throughout the book, Dalton
references this encounter as a model of sincere, forthright interracial
discussion of race. Lacking racial baggage of her own, this foreigner
pushed Dalton to let go of his. Rather than resort to evasive, self-
54. DALTON, supra note 12, at 27.
55. Id. at 16.
56. See id. at 16-17.




61. Id. at 21.
62. See id. at 16-21.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id. at 23.
19971
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serving, rehearsed, or contrived explanations for racial phenomena,
they jointly probed issues ranging from the higher incidence of
welfare dependence among blacks than whites to whites' preference
for white neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, according to Dalton, such dialogue is rare. Dalton
describes the ways and reasons that both whites and blacks often
avoid racial issues in integrated settings. "White folk avoid talking
about race in order to respect the presumed needs of people of color
who seem weary of the subject," he writes.6' Blacks often avoid race
for fear of "being put down, devalued, and not heard."66 Blacks also
expend enormous amounts of energy trying to make Whites
comfortable around us. We monitor our behavior so as to avoid
tapping into subliminal anxieties or fears and steer the conver-
sation to topics that are determinedly safe. We thus achieve a
measure of racial invisibility, but at a price-the setting aside of
much that is racially distinct about us.
Although Dalton clearly intends his analysis to apply to public as
well as private, interpersonal debate, he devotes little attention to that
distinction. He thus leaves unclear his beliefs about the links between
public and private dialogue. For example, he says that blacks'
expression on racial issues is stunted because they "worry that if we
own up to the problems that beset our communities.., our words
will somehow be turned against us ... taken as evidence of our racial
inferiority rather than our historic subordination."68 He then goes on
to urge blacks "to overcome, or at least transcend" such a fear,69
reasoning that "the best answer to our fear of being put down,
devalued, and not heard is more engagement [because] silence may
ensure that our own words will not be turned against us, [but] it can
do little to change the mind-sets that, if left unchallenged, will
continue to be our undoing. 7° Dalton's consideration of the
psychological toll of bottling one's feelings inside reinforces his belief
that blacks "are probably better off erring on the side of speaking our
minds, especially in settings where there is little risk of financial or
other retribution.",
71
At other times he seems to intend his observations to apply to
public debate more so than interpersonal communication:
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id. at 36.
67. Id. at 70.
68. Id. at 35.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 36.
71. Id. at 37.
226
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When it comes to race, too often the opinions and judgments of
people of color are regarded by Whites as subjective and self-
interested, and therefore of dubious value. We need look no
further than the legal academy to see this dynamic in action. At
many schools, people of color new to teaching are advised by
concerned White colleagues to avoid dealing with questions of
race in their scholarship. 'I just worry that your work won't be
taken seriously,' they are told. 'First get tenure. Then you can
write whatever you want.' Meanwhile, White junior faculty are
given free rein to write about race. If they produce quality work
that is supportive of the aspirations of people of color, they are
applauded. After all, they didn't have to come out that way. They
are also applauded if their scholarship is highly critical of
positions associated with prominent scholars of color, and are
cited for their 'bravery.' The assumption underlying all of this is
that people of color have a stake in how the story of race is told,
and perhaps even an ax to grind, whereas White scholars are
merely disinterested, impartial observers.
2
At another point Dalton describes what he terms the "'Disavow That
Leader' game,, 73 the process in which some blacks are called upon
to disavow other blacks as a means of affirming their own legitimacy
with whites. He uses the examples of Jesse Jackson and Louis
Farrakhan, and of Deval Patrick and Lani Guinier. During the 1984
presidential campaign, "Reverend Jackson was called upon to disavow
Minister Farrakhan ' '14 due to remarks Farrakhan had made. Similar-
ly, Deval Patrick, after being nominated to be Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, was "repeatedly asked to distance himself
from Lani Guinier... [who] had previously been asked to distance
herself from her own views and convictions."75 Dalton believes the
same process occurs beyond the political arena as well: "When Blacks
appeal to Whites for help, too often they are asked to first affirm that
they are not like the Black bogeyman of the moment., 76 Dalton
makes clear that he "would voluntarily take many a Black person to
task for spewing invective and spreading a politics of hate ... but [he
will] be damned if [he] will do so in response to White folk who want
to see [him] dance on a string. ,77 Dalton concludes that requests by
72. Id. at 44. Dalton presumably views the concerned white colleague as not simply
providing career advice, but as sharing the same biases that he warns the young black faculty
against: that black law professors who write about race are not to be taken seriously.
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 140.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 140-41.
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whites that one black disavow another "smack of an attempt to
control what gets said, to control who gets to say it, to divide
loyalties, and to ensure that the Black community's leaders are
tractable. '"78
Dalton's observations point toward what I believe are fundamental
and contestable assumptions that frequently buttress faith in the
dialogue as transformation approach. First, the belief that dialogue
promotes social change rests on uncertain assumptions about self-
knowledge and about the links between dialogue, attitudes, and
actions. Second, the potential benefits of interpersonal dialogue may
not translate into social change if private and public debate embody
different dynamics and are shaped by different forces.
III. THE LIMITS OF DIALOGUE
A. Self-Knowledge and Racial Dialogue (or The Limits of Honesty)
The benefits of honesty turn in part on the extent to which it
accurately expresses the complex of beliefs and attitudes that shape
people's opinions and behaviors. Honesty only reflects truth insofar
as it rests upon and reflects self-knowledge. The significance of
honesty and the transformative possibilities of dialogue are diminished
to the extent that "honesty" is the expression of biased, self-interested
interpretations of oneself and the world. If people are genuinely
unaware of their racial biases and the way in which racial con-
siderations may skew their perception or evaluation of political, social,
or economic issues, then frank discussion may be of limited value.79
In this sense, honesty will not uncover truth, because people's true
motivations reside beyond the reach of their insight and self-
awareness.
Americans may be unaware of the most fundamental ways in which
race colors their thinking. Social psychology has generated a
voluminous literature that demonstrates that frequently people
genuinely do not know when and in what way race has influenced
their response to an event, situation, or person.'0 Controlled
78. Id. at 140.
79. For a social-psychological account of how racial biases may influence an individual's
attitudes or behavior without the individual's awareness, see PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
RACISM (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). For a legal treatment of latent
racial bias, see Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
80. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 79, at 35-60 [hereinafter Gaertner &
Dovidio, Aversive Form]. The best legal treatment of the unconscious role of race is Lawrence,
supra note 79, at 317.
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laboratory studies of aversive racism, for example, have found that,
in certain circumstances, individuals respond differently to people
based in part on race,81 but do not perceive themselves to be doing
so. 82 Indeed, the widespread condemnation of racial animus in
American society provides a powerful incentive for people to interpret
their own views and behaviors in a manner that allows the main-
tenance of a non-prejudiced self-image. In the aversive racism studies,
for example, individuals' assertions that they have not responded
based on race when in fact they have represents not dishonesty but
the limits of honesty.
Similarly, the manipulation of race and its imagery has shaped
politics and voter preferences in ways that most voters would find
difficult to believe.83 Attitudes toward specific governmental policies,
for example, are frequently tied to attitudes toward the people
associated with a given policy. Though few people would recognize
that their own reactions to social policies are altered by their image
of the beneficiary group, political strategists regularly take account of
the link between attitudes toward a specific policy and attitudes
toward people thought to benefit from the policy. The recent attack
on affirmative action in California, for example, portrayed affirmative
action beneficiaries overwhelmingly as black although most affir-
mative action beneficiaries are white women. Opponents of affir-
mative action recognized that their assault on the policy stood the
greatest chance of success if they could portray it as primarily
benefitting black Americans.
The irony, then, of the social change of the past half century is that
while racial attitudes reveal Americans to be genuinely less opposed
to racial equality, race-based attitudes may nonetheless impede
further change. Only now, such attitudes are more difficult to
detect.84
B. Dialogue, Attitudes, and Behavior
If we put aside questions about the ability to ascertain one's
81. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice:
The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND
THE RESPONSE (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1997).
82. See Gaertner & Dovidio, Aversive Form, supra note 80.
83. See THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACrION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (noting how Republican party
coupled Democratic party and political issues with racial images to woo voters into voting
Republican).
84. See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2174-95 (1996) (describing ways in which changes in justificatory rhetoric may
render status inequality more resistant to challenge).
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motives and biases in connection with race, the dialogue as transfor-
mation approach relies on the links between dialogue and personal
attitudes, and between personal attitudes and behavior.
The extent to which interracial communication can change one's
racial views, although often taken for granted, is unclear.s5 Social
psychologists have found that among whites intraracial communication
about racial issues can lead to attitudinal changes. Whether a similar
result would obtain with black-white communication is uncertain, and
there is a substantial basis for believing that it would not. The
phenomenon of in-group favoritism is well established.86 Whites, for
example, may lend more credence to the views of other whites than
to those of blacks. In-group favoritism would likely be more extreme
with respect to dialogue about racial as opposed to nonracial issues,
because the racially oriented nature of the subject matter would make
the participants' racial group membership more salient.8 7 Thus, the
setting in which racial attitudes are most amenable to change
(intraracial dialogue) may also be the setting where those attitudes are
least likely to be challenged and most likely to be reinforced.
The connection between views and behavior is also uncertain.
While common knowledge dictates that changed views can change
behavior, the theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that the causal
link may work in reverse: Beliefs may change to correspond with
behavior.88 This phenomenon may be as applicable to socities as
individuals. To take a historical example, the transformation of racial
attitudes during the civil rights movement may have been the effect
rather the cause of social and legal change. The transformation of
American society stemmed more from Cold War pressures and from
America's having fought a war against the racism of Nazi Germany.
Opposing racism abroad intensified demands to oppose it at home as
well.89 Television de-regionalized the South (where the most
dramatic racial conflicts occurred) and focused worldwide attention on
the blatant mistreatment of black Americans in a country ostensibly
dedicated to equality. The turning of water hoses on peaceful protes-
85. See Margo J. Monteith et al., Prejudice and Prejudice Reduction: Classical Challenges,
Contemporary Approaches, in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Patricia
G. Devine et al. eds., 1994).
86. In-group favoritism operates both with groups that exist in the society and with groups
that are created in a research setting. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social
Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (Stephen
Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
89. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV.
61 (1988) (describing how pressures of Cold War prompted America's embrace of principle of
racial desegregation, as exemplified in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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ters assumed heightened international significance in light of
America's recent triumph over proponents of racial genocide. If the
dramatic changes in American race relations resulted in part from the
desire to be well regarded throughout the world,' American
society's legal and social transformation was propelled more by
foreign than domestic attitudes. American attitudes about racial
equality may have evolved along with and reinforced changes in
American society. And the Nazi example of the evil of racial thinking
no doubt shaped American as well as foreign attitudes. But changes
in American attitudes were not the sole or even a central factor in the
racial transformation of American society. In sum, whether interracial
dialogue about racial issues will change attitudes and, in turn,
behavior is a complicated matter-one that cannot be taken for
granted.
C. Private vs. Public
Dalton ably draws examples of the difficulties of dialogue from
both the private and public spheres. This implicitly raises the question
of the relationship between the spheres. Any analysis of the form and
function of dialogue must rely on assumptions about both public and
private debate.
One might view public discourse as merely the aggregation of
interpersonal exchanges, both governed by the same processes and
constraints. Large-scale attitudinal changes, and, for the sake of
argument, the resulting behavioral and policy changes, result from the
accumulation of changes among individuals who have been engaged
in interracial dialogue. Individual discussion neatly translates into
social transformation. Indeed, this seems to be Dalton's view. Toward
the end of the book, he discusses the interracial gospel choir in which
he sings and uses it as a model of the process of interracial com-
munication and racial healing. The choir truly seems admirable.
Whites who join it have chosen to immerse themselves in the cultural
experience of black gospel music. Yet, by focusing on the choir,
Dalton bypasses the fact that limits the efficacy of dialogue as
transformation: Black Americans are a numerical minority. The
admirable integration evidenced in his gospel choir could not be
replicated throughout America.91
Despite its intuitive appeal, the model of public debate as the
aggregation of interpersonal debate neither accurately captures the
90. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
91. Interestingly, even in this single gospel choir, integration was difficult to maintain, as the
group resorted to special outreach for black members in order to maintain racial balance.
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characteristics of public debate, nor creates a likelihood of altering the
views of a significant number of whites. Because black Americans are
a numerical minority in the United States,9 2 the possibility that
individual blacks in dialogue with individual whites will change the
views of a substantial number of white Americans is remote.93 Even
if every black American had an ongoing dialogue about racial issues
with at least one white person, the overwhelming majority of white
Americans would nonetheless remain excluded from interpersonal,
interracial exchange. In fact, such a projection probably overstates the
possibility of interracial dialogue. Residential segregation94 and the
unequal distribution of black and white Americans across employment
categories95 severely diminish the possibility of meaningful interracial
dialogue through interpersonal relationships.9 6  Given these
limitations, even if individual attitudinal changes resulted from
dialogue, their social impact would be questionable.
Moreover, an emphasis on raising racial consciousness through
interpersonal, interracial communication establishes those middle-class
blacks who work and live in largely white settings as the primary
channels through which interracial dialogue would occur. This
introduces the possibility that racial debate and its outcomes would be
skewed as a result of the particular interests, biases and experiences
of the black people who communicate with whites about racial
issues. 97 The concerns of the black middle class cannot be presumed
to reflect the needs and interests of black Americans more generally.
Inasmuch as the problems of race are intertwined with problems of
class, racial debate molded solely by the black middle class may
contribute to a dialogue that neglects those social problems that are
the most intractable precisely because they combine issues of race and
class. Indeed, the argument that debate about race already reflects the
92. Aside from their percentage of the population, blacks are also a minority in terms of
social, economic, and political power.
93. What will more likely change, based strictly on the numbers, are the views of those
blacks who most frequently discuss racial issues with whites.
94. See, e.g., DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (describing residential housing
patterns of all socioeconomic groupings of black Americans and hyper-segregation of black
underclass).
95. See, e.g., A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes
& Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE AND UNEQUAL 107-33 (1992).
96. Paradoxically, were America more occupationally and residentially integrated, interracial
relationships would be much more common, but then the need for racial change probably would
not be as pressing either.
97. For example, the discussion might become focused on issues that are more germane to
middle class, professional blacks and relegate to a subordinate position (or perhaps ignore al-
together) those issues affecting blacks who neither live nor work in white surroundings.
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class-biased interests of middle-class blacks illustrates the problem of
class bias.98 Ultimately, interracial discussion of racial issues through
interpersonal conversation by itself offers little prospect for either
improvement in race relations or diminution of racial inequality.
A more plausible account of public discourse is that it differs from
private, interpersonal communication not simply in scale, but also in
its dynamics and the channels through which it occurs. While people
may avoid race privately, blacks and whites alike volubly discuss it
publicly.99 In fact, race is a central concern of many of the nation's
most prominent black scholars and intellectuals."°° If public racial
debate is something other than the aggregation of private dialogue,
then what is it?
IV. A MODEL OF PUBLIC RACIAL DEBATE
Public racial debate occurs through the channels provided by the
media and publishing industries, and the perceived public response to
specific views partly determines which views are aired. The par-
ticipation of black Americans in public racial debate is shaped by A)
racial group power disparities, B) the legitimating power of blackness,
and C) underlying beliefs about black Americans.
A. Power Disparities
Even laudable examples of black inclusion in public debate occur
within the context of and are molded by the racial power disparities
dialogue is thought to help alter."'~ The extent to which individuals
and groups are able to participate in public debate hinges in part on
the media. "Access to the mass media is crucial" for anyone who
desires to participate in public debate. I°2 Speech is not free to the
98. Affirmative action, some contend, is the most obvious fruit of efforts to promote the
interests of the black middle class but not those of the black poor.
99. Examples of the public discussion of race are far too numerous to cite. Affirmative
action, for example, has received an incredible amount of media, political, and judicial attention.
Some of the most popular non-fiction books of the past several years have had to do with race.
See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM (1995); HACKER, supra note 95; RICHARD
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS
(1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 129-59.
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. DYSON, RACE RULES (1996); HENRY Louis GATES & CORNEL
WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE (1996); Robert S. Boynton, The New Intellectuals: African
American Intellectuals, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 53.
101. The most thought-provoking analysis of the role of black intellectuals in public debate
remains HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL (1967). See also Minow,
supra note 47, at 73 (observing that "the more powerful we are ... [the more] we are able to
put and hear questions in ways that do not question ourselves"). For an interesting response to
black Americans' limited influence over public debate and public policy, see Paul Butler, Black
Power in the Jury Box: The Case for Racially Based Jury Nullification, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
102. Ingber, supra note 40, at 38.
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extent that one must rely on others to provide a forum for it.103
Although the First Amendment's free speech guarantee generally
requires government neutrality as to different viewpoints and different
speakers,"° there is no parallel requirement of neutrality for private
media institutions. The fact that the government cannot "forbid the
expression of a particular idea""0 5 does little to promote those ideas
that do not find favor with the class of people that controls the media
and thus determines whose idea will be heard." 6 As one commen-
tator notes, "Media owners and managers, rather than the individuals
wishing to speak, thus determine which persons, facts, and ideas shall
reach the public."1"
The difficulty of gaining access to public debate would be less
worrisome were it not for racial group power disparities. Power may
be less salient in interpersonal exchanges, where interracial discussions
frequently occur among social and professional peers. But in the
public arena, race cannot be divorced from power. It may be that
"differences in . . . power and perspective at the very least make it
unlikely that politics will ever tend toward undominated
dialogue."'" Relative to white Americans, black Americans have
little control over the media through which one gains access to public
debate." In the words of one scholar, "The expense of speech
precludes [black Americans as a group] from participating effectively
in the marketplace of ideas."'10 Another comments, "If access to the
means of speech is effectively socially precluded on the basis of race
or class or gender, freedom from state burdens on speech does not
meaningfully guarantee the freedom to speak."' Thus, the norm of
unfettered discourse is never truly realized and "the speech of the
powerful impresses its view upon the world, concealing the truth of
powerlessness [among other groups, blacks in particular]."' 2
103. See id. A similar sentiment is expressed by the saying, "Freedom of the press belongs
to those who own one."
104. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
105. Post, supra note 41, at 132.
106. Of course, the media's promotion of some ideas but not others is based largely on the
perception of those in the media of what the public wants. Nonetheless, the media shapes public
appetites as much as it responds to them.
107. Ingber, supra note 40, at 38-39.
108. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1718 (1988).
109. Although advances in technology may redistribute the ability to enter public debate,
at this point the overwhelming portion of public dialogue that can impact the policies and
practices of public and private institutions with respect to race occurs in the traditional print
outlets of newspapers, magazines, and journals, as well as in the handful of broadcast outlets that
together mold the opinions of the majority of the nation's population.
110. Delgado & Stefanic, supra note 37, at 1287.
111. MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 208.
112. Id. at 155 (describing about gender what is also true of race).
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As a result of racial power disparities, black Americans, as a group,
have little control over the purposes toward which the views of
individual blacks are turned."t 3 Blacks are unable to channel racial
debate, even when their own views are a focus of the debate. While
there is always the possibility, regardless of one's race, that one's
views may be later distorted in support of goals of which one does not
approve,114 that possibility is heightened with black speakers on
racial issues due to the legitimating power of blackness and blacks'
lack of influence over the media that help to shape public policy and
opinion.
A prime illustration of black inability to channel debate involves
the book The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing
American Institutions, published in 1978 by William Julius Wilson, one
of America's most widely respected sociologists. He published the
book to highlight the worsening economic circumstances and
increasing marginality of the poorest black Americans, those who lack
the education and skills to move into the professional jobs made
available by the civil rights movement.115 The book develops two
related arguments. First, racial factors play less of a role than during
earlier eras in constraining the opportunities of black Americans.
Second, economic and demographic forces 16 have diminished the
opportunities and life chances of lower-class blacks so that their lives
and communities have become more marginal, isolated, and
economically stricken than a generation earlier. As a social democrat,
Wilson intended the book to provide empirical and theoretical
support for an expansion of social programs.
113. This is a theme of Derrick Bell's most recent book. See DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL
CHOIRS (1996). In the book, the central character, a black law professor modeled on Bell,
publishes a satirical article suggesting that all equal employment laws be repealed and that
blacks be removed from jobs to make room for "more qualified" whites. The article contains
a draft of the legislation necessary to accomplish that purpose. To the horror of the author,
conservative politicians seize on the mock legislation as the model for actual legislation.
114. The fabled "Moynihan report" is the classic example of this. Despite the fact that it was
meant to make the case for social programs targeted at black Americans, it came to be seen as
an indictment of the black family. For an excellent analysis of how Moynihan's views and goals
were twisted once the report entered the public domain, see DARYL M. ScoTr, CONTEMPT AND
PITY: EXPERTS, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE IMAGE OF THE BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1995 (1997).
115. Specifically, Wilson sought to explain the divergence in fortunes of different sectors of
the black community. The title of the book refers to the fact that middle-class blacks as a result
of the civil rights movement no longer face the racial roadblocks that impeded their
occupational, educational, and economic progress prior to the 1960s.
116. Specifically, Wilson argues that deindustrialization and the movement of jobs to
suburban areas created a spatial mismatch in which those blacks most in need of non-
professional jobs were geographically unable to reach them. The isolation of poor blacks in
inner-city areas was intensified by the movement away from central cities of middle-class blacks,
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The ensuing debate focused nearly exclusively on whether race was
declining in importance. If, as Wilson argued, race had declined in
importance, some political activists and politicians might use that fact
to justify opposition to social programs aimed at reducing racial
inequality. Ultimately, Wilson's argument was co-opted by those who
seized its analysis of the declining significance of race and the
expansion of opportunities for middle-class blacks and ignored
Wilson's description of the plight of lower-class blacks.117 The ar-
guments of a politically liberal black were thus manipulated to
support policies he opposed.'18
B. The Legitimating Power of Blackness
Although political conservatives certainly would have embraced
Wilson's argument had he been white,"9 his blackness offered an
additional benefit: It helped to create the impression that efforts to
dismantle race-based social programs are not racially biased. Blacks'
ostensibly meaningful role in decision-making processes partially
immunizes the resulting policies against charges that they are anti-
black.
No matter their personal intent or preferences, individual blacks
enter public debate as representatives of their race.a" Views
expressed by blacks are often used to legitimate views more common-
ly held by whites.'' Although it is frequently true, as Dalton notes,
117. For an elaboration of this point see David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics and the First
Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1030, 1036 (1995).
118. In his next book, Wilson focused soley on the worsening condition of the black
underclass. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). In the preface, id. at vii-xi, Wilson states explicitly
that he decided to write The Truly Disadvantaged because this aspect of The Declining
Significance of Race had been virtually ignored and because of his displeasure with the ways in
which his ideas had been manipulated by political conservatives.
119. The best example of a white social scientist championed by political conservatives is
Charles Murray, who wrote CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
FROM 1950 TO 1980 (1984), which argued that social programs worsened rather than alleviated
social ills.
120. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 5 (arguing that blacks often assume role of racial
representatives but should not do so); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING: ESSAYS ON THE
POLITICS AND POWER OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (1993) (expressing belief that interpretation and
understanding of speaker's views are unavoidably shaped by knowledge of speaker's identity,
perhaps causing listeners to read into or attach to speaker's views inferences and conclusions
that speaker did not consciously intend); Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1041 (using Cornel West's
phrase that "race matters" when blacks enter public debate).
121. Catherine MacKinnon's remark about women and men may also apply to blacks and
whites. As such, most blacks in power would be accountable to whites in power, because those
in power are usually white. See MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 220. Jerome McCristal Culp
takes this line of thinking a step further describing a federal judge as believing "that black
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that blacks' views are discounted, black Americans in some cases are
accorded a heightened degree of race-based authority.122 Views
vulnerable to accusations of racism when expressed by a white
become badges of bravery and individuality when expressed by a
black.1" Curiously, many white commentators who laud the moral
ideal of colorblindness 4 are not hesitant to note that their view of
a particular racial issue has been endorsed by this black economist or
that black writer." Why would someone who advocates
colorblindness ever mention the race of those who share his opinion?
Nominal black participation in debate implies that public discourse
is neither racially exclusive nor racially biased. Their participation
implies group inclusion and cleanses the debate of any taint of racial
bias, as though blacks could both negate the anti-black sentiment of
others and are immune to it themselves.
C. Beliefs About Black Americans
Dialogue is also shaped by values and assumptions that participants
share in common.1" What is heard is only that which finds its words
among the vocabularies of prevailing conversations. 27 Those views
that diverge too sharply from the underlying consensus or that
challenge assumptions otherwise taken for granted may not be heard
at all. Racial debate is thus channelled by prevailing, though rarely
explicitly stated, beliefs about black Americans. The extent to which
individuals, both black and white, gain entry into public debate
depends in part on the extent to which they accept, or at least fail to
challenge, prevailing views about blacks and the underlying as-
people cannot speak and defend themselves in a distinctive way. [Black] voices are important
only when they echo what white scholars have said or will say." Jerome McCristal Culp, Posner
on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J.
1095, 1107 (1992).
122. See Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1040-43.
123. See CARTER, supra note 5, at 125-91 (priding himself on his courage in breaking with
black orthodoxy and expressing ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that are widely shared in American
society); see also Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1066 (noting that blacks can gain acclaim by
"criticizing what is perceived to be the prevailing orthodoxy among black leaders").
124. On colorblindness as a moral ideal, see R. Richard Banks, "Nondiscriminatory"
Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76 B.U. L. REV. 669 (1997).
125. See CLINT BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE AcTION FRAUD (1996) (assailing color
consciousness yet repeatedly noting race of black scholars who share his views); STEVEN YATES,
CIVIL WRONGS at xxvii (1994) (professing importance of colorblindness, yet continually
mentioning that "a growing number of black intellectuals" share many of his views).
126. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 95,97 (noting that deliberative communication
occurs within context of shared major values).
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sumptions that frame racial debate. When those beliefs and assump-
tions posit black inferiority or justify racial inequality, black participa-
tion serves to legitimate the very state of affairs that the involvement
of blacks suggests has been transformed. From this perspective,
interracial dialogue about race, rather than leading to new understan-
dings, heightened sensitivities, and more nuanced insights, might
perpetuate existing power disparities and entrench racial subor-
dination. Conditions of substantive inequality might then become even
more resistant to change for having been legitimated by the process
of discourse."n
One example of the ways in which public debate legitimizes anti-
black sentiment is the controversy surrounding the best-selling 1994
book The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American
Life,129 by the late Richard Hermstein3 ° and Charles Murray. The
Bell Curve generated controversy due to its assertion, "demonstrated"
through empirical data, that black Americans are genetically inferior
to white Americans."' Although social scientists a generation earlier
had heralded the demise of scientific racism,132 and although explicit
claims of racial inferiority are met with opprobrium, The Bell Curve
was published by a mainstream publisher,133 heavily promoted, and
widely reviewed. Charles Murray attained celebrity status, with
appearances on numerous nationally televised programs, endless
128. Alan Freeman makes a similar argument with respect to anti-discrimination law. See
Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
129. See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 99.
130. With The Bell Curve, Herrnstein traveled familiar territory. See RICHARD HERRNSTEIN,
I.Q. IN THE MERITOCRACY (1973).
131. The several-hundred-page book, of course, considered much more than the relative
intelligence of blacks and whites. (Yet it was this feature that accounted for both the book's
popularity and the controversy it generated.) Eleven of the book's 22 chapters are explicitly
about race. See, e.g., THE BELL CURVE DEBATE (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds.,
1995); THE BELL CURVE WARS (Steven Fraser ed., 1995).
132. "One of the most important changes that laid the cultural groundwork for the civil
rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s was the discrediting of theories of biological
racism.... Not only did academe turn against notions of biological racism, but much of the
propaganda in the United States during World War II portrayed racism as inherently
antidemocratic." Lawrence Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary
Racial Attitudes, in ELIMINATING RACISM 94 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988);
see also ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS 68 (1977) ("Because of the close ideological
and collaborative links between the American eugenics movement and the leaders of Nazi
Germany... most American scientists believed that scientific racism had become one of the
unmourned casualties of World War II.").
133. The publisher was Basic Books.
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newspaper and magazine interviews, and no shortage of supporters
eager to proclaim his nonracist disposition.' 3
The book's assertion of black inferiority was taken seriously, even
by many well-known pundits and leading scholars.13 1 The New York
Times, generally regarded as the most widely respected and reputable
newspaper in America, published three separate articles about The
Bell Curve, two of which reviewed the book. The first New York
Times reviewer also considered books by J. Philippe Rushton136 and
Seymour W Itzkoff.137 Rushton asserts that there are genetic differ-
ences between blacks and whites that explain a wide range of social
phenomena, from criminality to physical health. 138 Rushton claims
that compared to whites, blacks have smaller brains (which makes
them less intelligent) and more active sexual drives, and are
predisposed to have more children but nurture them less.139 Itzkoff
argues that American economic competitiveness is undermined by
excessive procreation among the least intelligent and declining
procreation among the most intelligent."4  Along with Rushton,
Itzkoff attributes great explanatory power to supposed genetic
differences between groups of people. He ascribes the "underclass"
problem, for example, entirely to genetics 4' and traces the current
disadvantage of black Americans more generally to "the tragic
heritage of intellectual incapacity." '142 Recognizing that one might
take issue with such claims, the reviewer urged that "the possibility
that the authors may be even partly right makes these three books
worth plowing through and mulling over."'43 The other New York
134. Conservative pundit William F. Buckley, for example, has referred to Murray as a
"quiet, conscientious, scholarly social scientist." William F. Buckley, The Far Reaches of
Illegitimate Behavior, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at 33.
135. See, e.g., Daryl M. Scott, Cognitive Conceit: A Review of The Bell Curve, SOCIAL
POLICY, Winter 1994, at 50 (describing reluctance of both conservative and liberal reviewers to
classify The Bell Curve as racist).
136. J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR: A LIFE HISTORY
PERSPECTIVE (1994).
137. SEYMOUR W. ITZKOFF, THE DECLINE OF INTELLIGENCE IN AMERICA: A STRATEGY
FOR NATIONAL RENEWAL (1994).
138. Rushton also examines Asians, whom he consistently finds to be superior to both whites
and blacks. Thus, he would argue, his theory could not be predicated on notions of white
superiority or white supremacy because he has found whites generally to fall in between Asians
and blacks.
139. For Rushton's own summary of his views, see RUSHTON, supra note 136, at 259-75.
140. See ITZKOFF, supra note 137, at 74-78.
141. See id. at 111-12.
142. Id. at 147.
143. Malcolm W. Browne, What Is Intelligence, and Who Has It?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 3.
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Times reviewer decided to "leave the argument [about black genetic
intellectual inferiority] to experts."1"
Pundits and scholars echoed the New York Times's tone of calm
reserve and reasoned impartiality. Well-known syndicated columnist
Robert Samuelson, reviewing The Bell Curve in the Washington Post,
observed that the "mere suggestion of racial inferiority has, unfor-
tunately but inevitably, dominated debate about the book.
145
Remaining undecided on the issue of racial inferiority, Samuelson
declined to choose sides, though he did assure the reader that
"Charles Murray is no bigot."'" Stephen Jay Gould was one of the
few intellectuals whose refutation of the book expressed no reser-
vations or ambivalence.
147
Some reviewers who did not accept the book's conclusions about
race and intelligence focused instead on the importance of open
discussion and rebuked the book's critics for what they interpreted as
a narrow-minded attempt to stifle public debate about important
issues.1" The initial New York Times reviewer, referring to the
Rushton and Itzkoff books along with The Bell Curve, cautioned that
"[t]he government or society that persists in sweeping their subject
matter under the rug will do so at its own peril.'
49
144. Peter Passell, It's a Grim Message: Dummies Fail More Often, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1994, at C19.
145. Robert J. Samuelson, "Bell Curve" Ballistics, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1994, at A23.
146. Id.
147. See Stephen Jay Gould, Curveball, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 139; see also
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996) (debunking generally type of "scientific
inquiry" represented by The Bell Curve).
148. An interesting contrast is found in public reaction to The Bell Curve compared to the
reaction to books that might be thought to disparage groups other than blacks. For example, in
spring 1996, St. Martin's Press halted its plans to publish a biography of the Nazi Joseph
Goebbels because its subtext was that Jews brought the Holocaust upon themselves. The
publisher's decision was generally applauded and no other mainstream publisher offered to
publish the book. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Just Following Orders, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 15, 1996, at 74;
Doreen Caraval, Group Tries to Halt Selling of Racist Novel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1996, at 6;
Aryeh Neier, Publishing and Perishing, NATION, May 6, 1996, at 6-7.
149. Browne, supra note 143, at 3. The commentary about The Bell Curve was remarkably
similar to the atmosphere, nearly a quarter century earlier, when Richard Hermstein published
an article detailing views on race and intelligence similar to those contained in The Bell Curve.
Richard Hermstein, IQ, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1971, at 43-64. The editors of Atlantic
Monthly defended their decision to publish Hermstein's article because it is "necessary to have
a public discussion of important, albeit painful, social issues. The subject of intelligence is such
an issue-important because social legislation must come to terms with actual human
potentialities, painful because the actualities are sometimes not what we vainly hope." CHASE,
supra note 132, at 488 (citing Atlantic Monthly).
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Many leading black scholars declined to reject the implicit terms of
the discussion.' Glenn Loury, for example, sympathized with The
Bell Curve's authors, saying that they "will surely get more grief than
they deserve for having stated the facts of this matter: that on average
blacks lag significantly behind whites in cognitive functioning."'' As
to the validity of Murray and Herrnstein's claim of black intellectual
inferiority, Loury remained uncommitted. "[A]ny assertion of equal
black capacity," he wrote, "is a hypothesis, not a fact."15 He
rejected the assertion of black inferiority for moral reasons, describing
equality as "an ethical axiom, not contingent on psychological
fact."' 53 Reviewing The Bell Curve in the American Spectator,'54
Thomas Sowell did not accept the thrust of Murray and Herrnstein's
argument, but he pointed out its inconsistencies and unsubstantiated
inferences in a remarkably polite and respectful manner. Sowell
reserved his venom for those who castigated Murray and Herrnstein,
referring to such critics as "demagogues in the business of scavenging
for grievances."' 55 They were unwilling, Sowell said, to engage in
open debate about important issues. One of the few black columnists
at the Washington Post termed the book "a stink bomb" and
described Charles Murray as "something of an intellectual
daredevil.'
156
Most commentators, black and white alike, accepted the terms of
the debate established by Murray and Herrnstein. Some passionately
rejected the book's conclusions. Others presented detailed analyses of
Murray and Herrnstein's methodological flaws and invalid inferences.
Unfortunately such a mode of response validates the notion of black
inferiority and fails to lay bare its perniciousness. The inclusion of
blacks in the debate creates the pretense that the interests of black
150. Two notable exceptions are Claude Steele, a psychology professor at Stanford
University, and Daryl Michael Scott, a history professor at Columbia University. Professor Steele
analogized the discussion sparked by The Bell Curve to the dialogue about Jews in the years
preceding the Holocaust. See Claude Steele, Bizarre Black LQ. Claims Abetted by Media, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 31, 1994, at A23. See also Scott, supra note 135 (explaining that traditional
definition of racist refers to person who constructs hierarchies among racial groups and by this
standard, concluding, that Murray and Herrnstein are racists).
151. GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON
RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 306 (1995).
152. Id. at 308.
153. Id. at 309.
154. See Thomas Sowell, Ethnicity and IQ, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 1995, at 32.
155. Id. at 36.
156. William Raspberry, Is IQ Really Everything?, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at A23.
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Americans are represented, 15 7 and that, by implication, the process
and substance of the debate are not tainted by racial bias.158 Those
black scholars who commented on The Bell Curve did not simply add
one more view to the whirl of publicity the book generated; they
signified, by the fact of their race, that the substance of the book is
worth discussing on its merits and that neither the book nor the
discussion concerning it are racist.
Critiquing the substance of The Bell Curve suggests that its claim
of black inferiority is worthy of, and in need of, rebuttal. Thus, even
those scholars who purportedly rejected Murray and Herrnstein's
claim of black genetic inferiority lent the argument implicit credibility
simply by engaging it. The tone and substance of the responses
suggested that even if Murray and Herrnstein were not wholly correct,
their assertion that racial differences in intelligence partly explain
current patterns of racial inequality is at least plausible. By way of
contrast, a scholar who claimed that Jews brought about the
Holocaust would not be granted the respectability and the right to be
heard that was accorded Charles Murray.159
How might intellectuals have responded to The Bell Curve without
implicitly legitimizing it and lending credence to its argument of black
genetic inferiority? After all, as the best-selling work of scientific
racism of all time, the book's impact on public consciousness would
not dissipate as a result of its critics' scornful silence.
Commentators might have discussed the ways in which the astoun-
ding success of The Bell Curve reflected characteristic aspects of the
national social climate and widely shared sentiments within American
society. Such a response could have examined Murray and Her-
rnstein's assumptions about the genetic basis of race in light of the
fact that the category of "race" as a scientific construct has been
widely discredited. Why would so many scholars who on other
occasions have embraced the concept of race as a social construction
with no genetic basis suddenly lose sight of that accepted scientific
157. Presumably, there are many blacks, scholars, and others, who would dismiss the
Hermstein/Murray thesis about a link between intelligence and race as preposterous. Unfor-
tunately, such people are not among those who are able (or are selected) to express their views
through our nation's major magazines and newspapers.
158. This is analogous to the fact that in the employment context, the employer's promotion
of some blacks could be successfully used to rebut a Title VII disparate impact claim by other
blacks, even if those blacks are being held back for reasons that have to do with race. Barbara
J. Flagg develops this argument in her article Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy
for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995).
159. See supra note 148 (noting approval of publisher's decision not to publish anti-Semitic
tract). In addition to wide coverage in the print media, Charles Murray became a near-celebrity
through appearances on the Today Show, Nightline, and elsewhere. The respect generally
accorded Charles Murray is truly astounding. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 134, at 33.
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fact? Alternatively, such a response might have connected The Bell
Curve phenomenon to other developments within American society:
the rise of militias, opposition to affirmative action, the anti-immigrant
movement, and so forth. One might have used the controversy as a
case study in the anatomy of anti-black sentiment, much as scholars
have done with accusations that Jews brought on the Holocaust and
with the recent rise of neo-Nazis in Germany. My point is a simple
one: There are many ways to address The Bell Curve and the debate
it engendered without unintentionally legitimizing the book.
Due to the legitimizing power of blackness, many black writers and
intellectuals might be reluctant to express views that are particularly
likely to be distorted in ways of which they do not approve. For
example, many may decline to criticize other blacks or highlight
differences within the black community. Ironically, such a stance
creates the opening for harsher, less sympathetic criticism." Shelby
Steele's The Content of Our Character,'61 for example, garnered such
attention partly because it critiqued affirmative action, integration,
and black under-performance in a way other blacks had been
unwilling to do.'62 Had black intellectuals more honestly considered
the contradictions of affirmative action, black achievement, and in-
tegration, the hunger for a book such as Steele's may not have been
so great. 63 A similar point can be made about the focus by political
conservatives on social pathology within the black community during
the 1980s."6 Had black liberals taken it on themselves to explain
black social dysfunction in terms of something other than the
increasingly hollow and vague claim of racism, the opportunity for
political conservatives to manipulate black social problems for their
own ends might not have been so great.'65
160. Cf. Wilkins, supra note 117, at 1066 (arguing that potential distortion and misuse of
one's view's do not warrant silence).
161. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1990).
162. The same can be said about Richard Rodriguez's book Hunger of Memory, which
critiqued bilingual education and affirmative action. See RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF
MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1982).
163. This depends, of course, on the extent of anti-black sentiment in American society. The
greater the market for scholarly and popular works that vilify or can be used to vilify black
Americans, the less likely such hunger could be sated by more balanced analyses of black life.
164. The best example of conservative emphasis on black pathology is Charles Murray's
Losing Ground. See supra note 119.
165. William Julius Wilson makes this observation in The Truly Disadvantaged, where he
faults liberal analyses of racial inequality for "arguments [that] typify worn-out themes and make
conservative writers more interesting in comparison because they seem, on the surface at least,
to have some fresh ideas." WILSON, supra text accompanying note 115, at 12.
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V. CONCLUSION
Public dialogue about racial issues may neither further participation
in democratic self-government nor promote the discovery of truth to
the extent that many would like to believe. Public dialogue about race
may promote the illusion that public debate is free from racial bias
and equally open to members of all groups. Because prevailing
attitudes about black Americans may serve to limit speech that
questions racial assumptions, public dialogue may not lead to truth.
Rather, conversation may indirectly reinforce underlying assumptions
about race and racial differences. Ideas that contradict the widely held
assumptions that frame public debate may never be heard.1"
If public debate about race does not promote the remediation of
racial inequality because the debate is skewed by the very racial
power disparities it is thought to alter, then what is the point of all
the talk? If dialogue is not transformation, then what is its purpose?
Public racial debate may serve to memorialize the attitudes and
assumptions of the present era so that future generations may gain
insight into their own time through an analysis of ours. In this way,
mistakes of the present, which will only appear so with the acuity of
hindsight, perhaps are less likely to be repeated.
Although racial dialogue may not by itself lead to change, dialogue
may steer change precipitated by other influences in one direction
rather than another. Any given confluence of social, political, and
economic conditions may be susceptible to numerous paths of
change.167
Pundits and scholars would do well to focus on the content of
public debate and to illuminate the ways in which public debate about
race is skewed by the very racial inequalities such dialogue is intended
to alter. Paradoxically, it is only through attention to the distortions
of dialogue that we can hope eventually to realize its potential.
166. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA 116
(1976) (quoting Louis Wirth's statement that "elemental and important facts ... that are seldom
debated and generally regarded as settled" are at core of many controversies).
167. This is true of legal doctrine as well as racial conditions. See Robert W. Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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